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International business research points to the institutional environment as a core 
determinant of the countries’ ability to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). 
However, the extant research has been more focused on understanding the 
specific institutional of the transition and emerging economies and has left largely 
untapped African countries. In this paper we examine the impact of a selected 
number of six institutional dimensions on sub-Saharan countries’ ability to attract 
FDI inflows. Results show that the quality of the institutional environment is 
positively related to the FDI into these countries, confirming prior work on different 
geographies but showing some remarkable differences. We extend extant research 
on the institutional environments and distances into contexts of extreme under-
institutionalization that characterize much of the sub-Saharan African region. 
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1. Introduction
Understanding why some countries have greater 
capacity to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) has 
motivated researchers to seek the origins of that 
attractiveness, or the determinants of FDI. This is an 
important question from the standpoint of public 
policy by governments, but is also relevant to 
multinational firms, in that they evaluate a set of 
costs, risks and potential benefits in their 
international expansion decisions. The extant 
literature has identified several determinants of FDI. 
Some are specific to firms and emerge from firms’ 
specific advantages (Dunning, 1988, 1993), whilst 
others are related to the specific motivations of 
entering each country. Other determinants are 
related to the characteristics of the host countries 
(Peng & Khoury, 2008; Khoury & Peng, 2011). These 
host country characteristics may originate from 
economic factors, market size, purchasing power and 
income profile, but also from the legal, political, 
1 Corresponding author: Email: manuel.portugal.ferreira@gmail.com 
geographic, infrastructure, culture, level of taxation, 
restrictions on trade and investment, among others 
(Asiedu, 2004, 2006; Kaufmann et al., 2003, 2009; 
Naude, Krugell & 2007; Berry et al., 2010). Especially 
relevant for attracting FDI seem the institutional 
features of the countries (Kostova & Roth, 2003; 
Ferreira & Li, 2011). In the case of less developed 
countries, with higher levels of corruption, where 
informal institutions dominate and an infrastructure, 
for instance, the financial markets, is still incipient or 
ineffective (Kostova & Roth, 2003; Li & Ferreira, 
2011), the impact of the inefficiencies, 
ineffectiveness and institutional voids may be 
especially hazardous for firms and for attracting 
foreign investments. 
In the specific case of the sub-Saharan countries, 
there are recent evidence indicating that the FDI has 
been increasing in these sub-Saharan African 
countries, especially since the 1990s (Ndikumana, 
2003; Verick & Ndikumana, 2008), although these 
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countries are still largely marginalized in the 
worldwide FDI flows and unattractive to foreign 
investors (Naude & Krugell, 2007; Ndikumana; Verick, 
2008; Darley, 2012). The challenge for public policy is 
how to create conditions of security, efficiency and 
effectiveness to become more attractive destinations 
for international investors (Ndikumana & Verick, 
2008; Darley, 2012). Some of the most notable 
barriers include a relatively small market size given 
the high level of poverty and lack of communication, 
transportation and sanitary infrastructure. 
Nonetheless, the largest obstacles may reside in the 
institutional setting of these countries that by being 
ineffective present hazards, risks and additional costs 
to foreign investor firms (Asiedu, 2004, 2006; Naude 
& Krugell, 2007). 
In this paper we analyze the impact of a selected 
set of institutional variables of the 48 sub-Saharan 
countries in their ability to attract foreign direct 
investment. Methodologically, we used the World 
Governance Indicators of the institutional 
environment (see Kaufmann et al., 1999; Kaufmann 
et al., 2003, 2009) – voice and accountability, political 
stability, control of corruption, rule of law, regulatory 
quality and government effectiveness – for the 48 
countries of sub-Saharan Africa. This study thus aims 
at complementing the small but growing debate on 
the determinants of FDI, specifically on the impact of 
the institutional environment determinants on FDI in 
sub-Saharan Africa (see also Asiedu, 2002, 2004; 
Naude & Krugell, 2007; Asiedu & Lien, 2011). 
This study contributes to a better understanding 
of the real impact of institutional weaknesses on FDI 
inflows in conditions of extreme institutional 
deficiencies, such as those likely to be found in sub-
Saharan Africa. Focusing on a group of countries that 
has remained surprisingly largely under-researched 
in prior literature – perhaps due to their low 
participation in the international trade and 
investment flows – we capture those countries with 
larger institutional voids and where the risks for 
foreign firms are heightened by the political and 
social instability. Despite not specifically accounting 
for the differences that exist within the institutional 
environments in these African economies, these 
countries are among those with worst, or less 
sophisticated, institutional environments (Asiedu, 
2004). This context is particularly relevant given that 
institutions reduce uncertainty for the different 
agents, constraining the dominant norms and 
defining the boundaries of what is taken as legitimate 
behaviors and actions (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983). 
This study also contributes to put into context that 
frequently used and established indicators, such as 
the World Governance Indicators, require deeper 
examination. Perhaps, when exposed to extreme 
conditions, such as those in sub-Saharan Africa, 
additional dimensions ought to be considered and 
results may vary from those found in other 
institutional settings. 
This paper is organized in four parts. First, we 
present the conceptual model based on a set of 
hypotheses advancing that the quality of the 
institutional environment is likely related to the 
countries’ ability to attract FDI inflows. In the second 
part, we present the method, including sample, 
variables and statistical procedure. The third part 
comprises the results followed by a broad discussion 
and pointing out limitations and suggestions for 
future research. 
2. Conceptual model and hypotheses 
International business research often analyzes how 
the differences between countries – that occur in the 
political, economic, cultural, technological, 
infrastructure and institutional environments – 
influence firms’ decisions, namely the decision to 
carry out FDI operations, or simply to export to the 
country. Thus, firms entering a foreign country must 
be knowledgeable of the host country institutional 
conditions they will face (Brouthers, 2002; Ferreira & 
Li, 2011). Scott (1995) defined institutions as the 
regulatory, normative and cognitive structures that 
provide stability and meaning to social behavior. 
Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that 
structure human interaction (North, 1990; 
Dumludag, Saridogan & Kurt, 2009). The host 
countries’ institutional characteristics encompass 
normative and regulatory components and cognitive 
domains that influence virtually all behaviors of the 
multinational corporations (Henisz & Swaminathan, 
2008). 
The quality of the institutional environment is a 
key determinant of FDI flows (Benassy-Quéré et al., 
2007). First, good governance infrastructure may 
attract foreign investors, because the quality of the 
institutions is crucial for macroeconomic stability and 
the development of the private business sector. 
Second, poor institutions may entail additional costs 
to FDI, for example, corruption (Wei, 2000). Third, FDI 
is particularly vulnerable to all kinds of uncertainty, 
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including the uncertainty accruing from government 
inefficiency, policy changes, weak enforcement of 
property rights and weak legal system. Hence, it is 
probable that FDI flows are larger between countries 
exhibiting relatively similar institutions, and it is 
equally likely that firms will find it harder to evaluate 
countries that differ more markedly from their own 
domestic institutional environment (Benassy-Quéré 
et al., 2007). Fourth, better economic, political and 
social institutions, and more effective protection of 
property rights in a country, contribute to improve its 
attractiveness to foreign investors (Dumludag et al., 
2009). In contrast, frequent public policy changes, 
political risk and institutional insufficiencies 
significantly discourage FDI (SINGH; JUN, 1995). 
Finally, countries that wish to increase foreign 
investment inflows may be able to do so by improving 
their institutional milieu, namely establishing and 
implementing a predictable set of economic policies 
(Daude & Stein, 2007). 
The inefficiencies of the institutions in less 
developed economies generate additional costs and 
delays in foreign investments (Estrin et al., 1997). 
MNCs internationalizing into under-institutionalized 
countries, such as transition and emerging 
economies or sub-Saharan countries face greater 
uncertainty due to high inflation, opaque regulatory 
environments, and underdeveloped financial and 
legal systems (Grosse & Trevino, 2005). Institutional 
inefficiencies increase the costs associated with the 
implementation of FDI in the host country, and the 
uncertainties related not only to conducting the 
operations but also to the prospects of long term 
investments (Grosse & Trevino, 2005). 
 
Fig. 1 
Conceptual model 
In sum, the quality of the institutions of a country is 
an important determinant of its attractiveness for 
foreign investment (Blonigen, 2005). The conceptual 
model in Figure 1 summarizes our hypotheses on the 
impact of the quality of the institutional environment 
on FDI inflows in regions particularly under-
institutionalized and fraught of institutional voids, as 
in sub-Saharan Africa. 
2.1 Voice and accountability 
The concept of voice and accountability refers to the 
political process, civil rights and institutions that 
facilitate the control of government actions by 
citizens and independent media. Democratic 
governance institutions generate credibility with the 
foreign investors (Jensen, 2003). Analyzing the 
relationship between fundamental democratic rights 
and FDI, Harms and Ursprung (2002), Jensen (2003) 
and Busse (2004) found that MNCs are attracted by 
democratic regimes, and Li and Resnick (2003) noted 
that democratic rights induced better property rights 
protection that are essential to foreign investment. 
Additionally, elected, or democratic, governments, 
are accountable for their actions, including the 
breach of contracts (Jensen, 2003), with 
consequences in future electoral processes. 
Harms and Ursprung (2002), Cuervo-Cazurra and 
Genc (2008) and Asiedu and Lien (2011) have argued 
that there is a sense that MNCs prefer investing in 
authoritarian regimes because they are able to 
extract greater benefits in the form of investment 
subsidies and lower labor costs – possibly due to lack 
of popular pressure and repression over the labor 
unions to maintain low wages. That is MNCs may still 
invest in those countries if there are business 
opportunities worth pursuing, as evidenced by the 
FDI inflows into China despite an authoritarian 
regime (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008). However, the 
impact of low wages on FDI decisions might be over-
estimated, and the alleged stronger property rights 
protection offered by repressive regimes may be an 
illusion (Harms & Ursprung, 2002). Hence, albeit 
autocratic governments may favor and protect 
certain investors, they have large discretionary power 
in decision making and foreign investors are 
subjected to the risks of policy changes or that the 
regime bursts into revolution (Harms & Ursprung, 
2002). 
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Hypothesis 1: The quality of voice and 
accountability of sub-Saharan African countries is 
positively related to their ability to attract FDI. 
2.2 Political stability 
Political stability refers to the risk of destabilization or 
removal of a government from power in a violent or 
unconstitutional manner (Kaufmann et al., 2003). 
Changes of politicians may lead to changes in policies 
towards foreign investment and existing contracts. 
Bhinda et al. (1999) noted how a stable government 
in Tanzania and Uganda encouraged FDI in these 
countries. However, Instability is endemic 
throughout sub-Saharan Africa and undermines 
efforts to attract FDI to the region (Dupasquier & 
Osakwe, 2006; Cleeve, 2008). Sub-Saharan Africa has 
been exposed to numerous coups, for example in 
Guinea-Bissau (in 2011) and the Central African 
Republic (in 2012), as well as military governments 
and regimes where presidents have been in power 
for decades, as in Angola and Zimbabwe. Political 
instability in the sub-Saharan Africa countries also 
emerges from frequent wars, military interventions in 
politics and religious and ethnic conflicts (Rogoff & 
Reinhart, 2003; Dupasquier & Osakwe, 2006). All 
these forms of political instability raise the risks for 
foreign investors. 
Hypothesis 2: The political stability of sub-Saharan 
African countries is positively related to their 
ability to attract FDI. 
2.3 Control of corruption 
The effects of corruption as “sand” that undermines 
the attractiveness to FDI are well known (Wei, 2000; 
Uhlenbruck et al., 2006; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006, 
2007). The World Bank defines corruption as the 
abuse of power to obtain private benefits and 
includes paying or receiving bribes, embezzlement, 
favoritism, transactions for personal gain, misuse of 
influence or irregular payments in public 
procurement, among others. Corruption in the 
existing institutional apparatus increases the hazards 
of operating in some countries (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1993; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2007), and heightens the 
uncertainties and costs of having to pay to get things 
done (Kaufmann et al, 2003), thus decreasing FDI 
(Wei, 2000).  In these instances, firms are likely to 
seek alternative informal channels to resolve their 
problems (Li & Ferreira, 2011) and, as noted by Dixon 
and Polyakov (1998) in the case of the widespread 
corruption in the Soviet political system, bribery has 
become a guarantee that agents (e.g., government 
officials) fulfill their official functions (Olson, 1995). 
One of the biggest obstacles to doing business in 
Africa is corruption (Anyanwu, 2006). Corruption 
generates lower investor confidence that discourages 
future foreign investments (Mauro, 1995). According 
to Li and Ferreira (2011), additional payments to 
officials are additional transaction costs that 
encourage firms to rely more on informal relations 
that avoid involvement with government officials. 
Corruption is endemic throughout Africa and is one 
of the main reasons for MNCs not investing in Africa 
(Dahou & Khalil, 2009). Mmieh and Owusu-Frimpong 
(2004), for example, concluded that bribery and 
corruption are deeply rooted in the African socio-
economic and political systems, and are the main 
barriers to attracting FDI. 
Hypotheses 3: The level of control of corruption in 
sub-Saharan African countries is positively related 
to their ability to attract FDI. 
2.4 Rule of law 
Rule of law refers to the effectiveness and 
predictability of the judiciary and enforceability of 
contracts. Complex and opaque regulatory structures 
undermine the attraction of FDI (Anyanwu, 2006; 
Dupasquier & Osakwe, 2006; Cleeve, 2008) because 
foreign investors value countries with sophisticated 
legal and judicial systems to ensure the safety of their 
investments (Dupasquier & Osakwe, 2006). Kinoshita 
and Campos (2004) noted that a weak legal system, 
including violations of property rights, and greater 
government participation in the economy, is a strong 
deterrent to FDI. Weak law enforcement and lack of 
credible property protection mechanisms are 
significant obstacles to FDI in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Some examples of risks include expropriation 
(Kinoshita & Campos, 2004), difficulty of using the 
judiciary system to resolve contract conflicts with 
partners (Henisz, 2000; Henisz & Swaminathan, 2008; 
Li & Ferreira, 2011). 
Hypothesis 4: The quality of the rule of law in the 
sub-Saharan African countries is positively related 
to their ability to attract FDI. 
2.5 Regulatory quality 
The regulatory quality refers to the content of public 
policies, such as the existence of market-unfriendly 
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legislation, price control mechanisms, and other 
forms of excessive regulation – including licensing 
regulation, opening of new businesses, hiring 
workers, import production factors, payment of 
taxes, governmental fees and licenses, etc. 
(Kaufmann et al., 2003; Li & Ferreira, 2011). It is up to 
governments to regulate the activities of domestic 
and foreign firms operating in the country (Holmes et 
al., 2012). These firms expect regulatory institutions 
to establish a set of explicit rules to minimize 
uncertainty. In credible countries, the existence of 
controls protects property rights and guarantees 
potential foreign investors against potential 
government arbitrary actions (Kaditi, 2010). 
Conversely, when these fail, firms are likely to hold 
back in realizing new investments, especially in long 
term commitments (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008). 
Low quality of institutions needed for the proper 
functioning of markets increases the cost of doing 
business in sub-Saharan Africa and distorts 
investments, while insufficient legal protection of 
assets increases the possibility of expropriation and 
contribute to decreased FDI (Blonigen, 2005). 
Hypothesis 5: The quality of the regulatory 
structures of the sub-Saharan African countries is 
positively related to their ability to attract FDI. 
2.6 Government effectiveness 
Government effectiveness refers to the quality of the 
bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, public 
service quality and credibility of the government’s 
commitment to its policies (Kaufmann et al., 2003, 
2009). Governments influence firms’ decisions 
through policies regulating foreign investment, 
prices, mergers and acquisitions activity, 
employment, wages, dividends, tax policies and 
defining and enforcing quality standards (North, 
1990; Delios & Henisz, 2000). Public policies can 
create an enabling environment for FDI inflows 
(Darley, 2012) or, conversely, discourage FDI inflows 
by an inefficient use of financial resources (to satisfy 
special interests) and by the distortion of private 
incentives through taxes and specific regulations that 
create inefficiencies (Levine & Renelt, 1992). 
In sub-Saharan Africa, government intervention is 
often unpredictable and arbitrary, seeking to satisfy 
voters and win popular support, without following 
political direction or a clear economic strategy. 
Governments have the legal monopoly on coercion 
and are present in every economic transaction 
(North, 1990), and changes in regulatory or fiscal 
policies (Delios & Henisz, 2000) are likely to have a 
negative impact on firms. Good governance needs to 
promote economic performance, and should 
encourage FDI indirectly, raising the possibility of 
profitable business activities (Globerman et al., 
2004). 
Hypothesis 6: The effectiveness of the actions of 
the governments of sub-Saharan countries is 
positively related to its ability to attract FDI. 
3. Method 
We tested the hypotheses with an econometric 
analysis using data on the FDI inflows, in 2011, for 
each of the 48 countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Using 
this enlarged sample of countries we are better able 
to assess how the attractiveness to FDI varies based 
on the characteristics of the institutional 
environment of these countries. The majority of the 
data was collected from the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 
World Development Indicators and Worldwide 
Governance Indicators. Methodologically, we 
followed similar studies (Wei, 2000; Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2006, 2007; Daude & Stein, 2007; Kaditi, 2010) and 
used a Tobit model for the statistical tests. 
3.1 Variables 
Table 1 summarizes the variables and data sources. 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of FDI 
inflows in US dollars, for each of the 48 sub-Saharan 
African countries. 
The independent variables are the six dimensions 
of institutional environment, measured as in prior 
studies (Kaufmann et al., 2003, 2009; Daude & Stein, 
2007; Kaditi, 2010) in units ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, 
with higher values corresponding to better 
governance. Additional details on the measures may 
be obtained in www.govindicators.org. We followed 
the procedure by Kaditi (2010) and rescaled the 
values to vary in the range 0 to 5, with 5 representing 
better institutional quality. The institutional 
independent variables were measured using data 
from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
2010. 
The indicator on voice and accountability refers to 
the level of participation of citizens in selecting their 
governments, freedom of expression, civil rights, 
freedom of association and free media (Kaufmann et 
M. P. Ferreira & J. G. Ferreira 
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al., 2003). The variable captures the perceptions of 
governance by families and individuals, as well as the 
subjective evaluations of a variety of service 
providers of business information, nongovernmental 
organizations, a number of multilateral organizations 
and other government agencies around the world 
(Kaufmann et al., 2003). 
Political stability refers to individuals' perceptions 
on the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or 
violent means, including politically motivated 
violence and terrorism (Kaufmann et al., 2003, 2009; 
Daude & Stein, 2007; Kaditi, 2010). 
Control of corruption is the perception capturing 
the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as the “capture” of the state by 
elites and private interests (Kaufmann et al., 2009; 
Daude & Stein, 2007; Darley, 2012). 
Rule of law refers to agents' perceptions on their 
confidence and respect for the rules of society and, 
namely to the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police and the courts, as well as 
the likelihood of crime and violence (Daude & Stein, 
2007; Kaufmann et al., 2009). 
The 'regulatory quality' refers to the perceptions 
on the government's ability to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit 
and promote private sector development (Daude & 
Stein, 2007; Kaufmann et al., 2009). 
Finally, 'government effectiveness' refers to the 
perception on the quality of public services and the 
degree of its independence from political pressures, 
the quality of policy formulation and implementation, 
and the credibility of the government's commitment 
to such policies (Daude & Stein, 2007; Kaufmann et 
al., 2003, 2009). 
We also included a set of control variables to 
eliminate alternative explanations. We used the data 
available in the World Development Indicators, 
except for freedom of trade, in which we used data 
from the Heritage Foundation. GDP is an indicator 
used to assess a country's wealth. FDI flows depend 
heavily on GDP (Benassy-Quéré et al., 2007) and GDP 
growth is expected to attract more FDI (Anghel, 
2005). GDP per capita was used in prior studies as a 
control variable (Benassy-Quéré et al., 2007; Daude & 
Stein, 2007; Kaditi, 2010; Khoury & Peng, 2011), with 
the results usually showing a positive relationship 
with FDI. The impact of GDP per capita on FDI is 
theoretically ambiguous since a high GDP per capita 
reflects a high consumer purchasing power but also 
high wages (Benassy-Quéré et al., 2007). To assess 
macroeconomic stability, we used the rate of inflation 
such that a greater macroeconomic stability reduces 
the investment uncertainty, lowers transaction costs 
and increases confidence in the economy, stimulating 
FDI (Busse & Hefeker, 2007; Kaditi, 2010). The 
variable population was used to control for market 
size (see Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Darley, 2012), since 
larger countries tend to be more attractive for MNCs 
given their market potential. We also included the 
natural resources endowment (Morisset, 2000; 
Asiedu, 2006). Finally, we included trade freedom 
because countries with low trade barriers also tend 
to have low barriers to FDI (Morisset, 2000) and firms 
may overcome trade restrictions by carrying out FDI 
operations. Data on trade freedom were obtained 
from the Heritage Foundation, 2010, following the 
methodology by Resmini (2000) and Mateev (2009). 
3.2 Sample 
The sample comprises the 48 sub-Saharan countries: 
South Africa, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Comores, Congo, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Kenya, Rwanda, São Tomé 
and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone Seychelles, 
Somalia, Swaziland, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
Albeit they are countries from the same region, 
there are notable differences among them (Darley, 
2012). These are differences pertaining to economic 
development, cultural (former colonies of different 
European countries that left a diverse cultural 
heritage), population and natural resources 
endowments. Some countries, such as South Africa, 
Angola and Nigeria hold abundant natural resources, 
and despite a high corruption index (e.g., Angola and 
Nigeria) are able to attract larger FDI inflows, in 
contrast with other countries with better institutions, 
such as Cape Verde and Mauritius, with poor natural 
resource pools (Darley, 2012). 
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3.3 Procedures 
Since we have logarithmic variables in both sides of 
the equation, namely FDI, GDP and population, this 
specification is referred to as a double log model 
(Wei, 2000). The logarithmic transformation of the 
dependent and independent variables should help 
close the error term (ε) homoscedasticity (Wei, 
2000). As in previous studies (e.g., Cuervo-Cazzura, 
2006), we used a one year lag for the independent 
variables (n-1), to accommodate the time lag that 
occurs between the analysis of a given investment 
and its actual implementation. According to Daude 
                                                          
2 The Tobit model is a statistical model advanced by Tobin (1958) 
to describe the relation between a non-negative dependent 
variable and an independent variable. 
and Stein (2007), using FDI as the dependent variable 
may have problem of dealing with observations with 
zero value. In this work we do not have observations 
with values of zero, neither negative values, since we 
are only examining FDI inflows by host country. 
We used a non-linear Tobit2 model, following 
Daude and Stein (2007), Wei (2000) and Cuervo-
Cazurra (2006), given the higher robustness of the 
results. The model has the following form: Ln (FDIit) 
= yl INSTITUTIONSit-1 + βXit-1 + εi. Where FDIit is the 
FDI inflow in country i in 2011. INSTITUTIONSit-1 is 
the perceived index of the institutional variables in 
Tab 1 
Variables and sources of data 
Variables Measure Source 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 Ln FDI inflow 2011 Natural logarithm of FDI inflow in the country and the year, in million US 
dollars at current prices and current exchange rates. 
UNCTAD (2011) 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Voice and accountability Reflects the perceptions of the level of participation of the citizens of a 
country in selecting their government, as well as the freedoms they can 
rely on. (from 0 to 5) 
Worldwide Governance 
Indicators. 2010 values. 
Political stability Reflects the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-
motivated violence and terrorism. (0 to 5) 
WGI. 2010 values. 
Control of corruption Refers to capture perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain. (0 to 5) 
WGI. 2010 values. 
Rule of law Refers to the level of legal regulation in a society. (0 to 5) WGI. 2010 values. 
Regulatory quality Reflects the government's capacity to formulate and implement policies 
and regulations that promote the development of the private sector. (0 to 
5) 
WGI. 2010 values. 
Government effectiveness Reflects the effects and consequences of good governance. (0 to 5) WGI. 2010 values. 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
Ln GDP Natural logarithm of GDP in millions of U.S. dollars in the year and in the 
country. 
World Development 
Indicators, World Bank. 
2010 values. 
GDP per capita GDP per capita in the country and the year, in millions of dollars in the 
country. 
WDI. 2010 values. 
Macroeconomic stability Percentage increase in consumer prices, in the year and country. WDI. 2010 values. 
Ln population Natural logarithm of the number of inhabitants in the year and country. WDI. 2010 values. 
Trade freedom A composite measure of the absence of tariff and non-tariff barriers that 
affect imports and exports of goods and services, in the year and country. 
Index of Economic 
Freedom, da Heritage 
Foundation. 2010 
values. 
Natural resources Total yields of natural resources (oil, natural gas, coal, minerals and 
forests), in the country and year. 
WDI. 2010 values. 
Source: The authors 
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country i in 2010, γl is the parameter of interest, Xi t-
1 is a vector of the control variables, β is a vector of 
other parameters, and ε is the scholastic error 
remaining. Other robustness tests using the values 
for the independent values for t-2 (2009) and t-3 
(2008) with identical results. Using a lag between 
independent and dependent variables is a standard 
procedure since firms first evaluate their investment 
opportunities before actually doing the investments 
(Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008). Nonetheless, we 
ought to acknowledge that OLS estimations based on 
cross-sectional data may result in inconsistent 
estimates for not accounting for endogeneity of some 
regressors (Naude & Krugell, 2007). 
4. Results 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics and 
correlation matrix. As might be expected, the 
independent variables have high correlation, which 
might be expected since we believe that on aggregate 
each individual component of the institutional 
environment will tend reflect the overall state of the 
country. In any instance, additional procedures were 
implemented and specifically, we followed the 
procedure in Daude and Stein (2007) and Kaditi 
(2010) and grouped the institutional variables that 
capture somewhat identical facets into two broader 
dimensions to reduce the problems of measuring the 
individual components. Hence we grouped the 
average of ‘voice and accountability’ and ‘political 
stability’ grouped into a ‘Political stability and 
freedom’ dimension. Similarly, we grouped the 
average of ‘control of corruption’, ‘rule of law’, 
‘regulatory quality’ and ‘government effectiveness’ 
into a ‘Government efficiency’ dimension. This 
procedure is reasonable since we do not face 
multicollinearity between the dependent and the 
independent variables. Finally, it is worth noticing 
that all the countries share low institutional 
development across the indicators (confirming 
Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008). 
Table 3 presents the results of the hypotheses 
tests. Model 1 includes only the control variables. 
Model 2 tests hypothesis 1, proposing a positive 
relation between voice and accountability and FDI 
inflows.  A positive and statistically significant 
coefficient (p<0.05) confirms H1, which contrasts 
with a positive but not significant coefficient in Daude 
and Stein’s (2007) work. Model 3 tests H2, on the 
positive impact of political stability, confirming a 
positive and significant (p<0.1) relation to the ability 
to attract FDI inflows. This result also contrasts with 
the lack of statistical evidence by Daude and Stein 
(2007) and Kaditi (2010). Model 4 tests H3 on the 
influence of control of corruption On FDI. A positive 
and statistically significant coefficient (p<0.01), 
supports H3. Model 5 tests H4, and a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient (p<0.05) confirms a 
positive relation between greater development of 
Rule of Law and the countries’ ability to attract FDI 
inflows. Model 6 tests H5 and a positive and 
significant coefficient (p<0.05) confirms that 
regulatory quality is positively related to FDI. Finally, 
model 7 confirms H6 revealing that greater 
government effectiveness is positively related to FDI.  
In model 8 we run the regression with the 
calculated ‘Political stability and freedom’ variable, as 
explained previously. A positive and significant 
coefficient (p<0.05) confirms a positive relation with 
FDI. In model 9 we used the ‘Government efficiency’ 
variable, and a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient (p<0.01) reveals a positive relation 
between this institutional quality and FDI inflows. 
Tab 2 
Variables and sources of data 
Variables Min Max Mean St. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Ln FDI 15.76 25.59 21.4802 1.706             
2. Voice accountability .35 3.39 1.868 .744 .070            
3. Political stability -.61 3.46 1.967 .976 -.053 .633**           
4. Control of corruption .76 3.48 1.897 .618 -.054 .683** .692**          
5. Rule of law .06 3.35 1.758 .640 .073 .785** .763** .894**         
6. Regulatory quality .12 3.39 1.795 .647 .198 .789** .599** .728** .888**        
7. Government effectiveness .26 3.26 1.702 .631 .137 .745** .647** .859** .926** .890**       
8. Ln GDP 19.12 26.62 22.692 1.500 .760** .001 -.230 -.153 .034 .250 .159      
9. GDP per capita 199.00 20703.00 2161.745 3675.842 .225 .063 .422** .164 .276 .154 .211 .164     
10. Inflation -2.4 16.6 5.541 4.750 .202 -.069 -.180 -.188 -.240 -.191 -.177 .185 -.084    
11. Ln population 11.37 18.88 15.723 1.608 .463** -.162 -.531** -.363* -.258 -.012 -.124 .740** -.442** .242   
12. Trade freedom 31.9 87.8 64.835 10.128 .156 .267 .057 .205 .338* .392** .300* .388** -.099 .207 .352*  
13. Natural resources .0 66.4 12.521 16.399 .393** -.365* -.173 -.484** -.370* -.319* -.398** .341* .301* .170 .115 .004 
Source: Data of Research 
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5. Discussion 
In this paper we examined empirically the impact of a 
set of selected institutional variables – the 
governance indicators developed by Kaufmann et al. 
(2003, 2009) – in the sub-Saharan African countries’ 
ability to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) 
inflows. We sought to better understand how the 
quality of the host countries’ institutional 
environment might impact FDI inflows, thus 
complementing extant studies (e.g., Asiedu, 2004, 
2006; Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2007; Busse & Hefeker, 
2007; Daude & Stein, 2007; Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 
2008; Kaditi, 2010; Asiedu & Lien, 2011) even if many 
of these have looked primarily into developed, 
transition and emerging countries. The African 
countries have been rather under-studied in 
international business research, perhaps because 
they account for only a minute share of the 
worldwide economic activity, trade and investment 
flows, although they represent about 15% of the 
world population (and the sub-Saharan countries for 
about 12%). As a group, these countries 
stereotypically hold high institutional deficiencies and 
MNCs seeking to enter these countries need to have 
the ability of operating in under-institutionalized 
environments.  
Hence, examining the institutional determinants 
of FDI is important for academics, policy-makers and 
managers of multinational corporations. For 
academics the sub-Saharan context provides a setting 
to test theory under extreme institutional conditions 
not found in the western countries that are more 
often studied. The results may provide insights for 
theory building. For policy makers it is important to 
attract FDI that contributes to develop multiple areas 
of the countries and alleviate poverty (Asiedu, 2004). 
Thus, understanding what can be improved to attract 
more foreign investment is relevant. For instance, 
policies to reduce bureaucracy, based on strategies 
for transparent regulation, and establishing a sound 
managerial system for the collection of taxes are 
among the main challenges to improve the 
investment climate in Africa (World Bank, 2005, p. 
40). That is, understanding what may be hindering 
FDI inflows is a good indication of the actions that 
ought to be taken to promote additional FDI in sub-
Saharan countries. For managers this study is 
pertinent since they need to understand the multiple 
facets of the environments in the foreign countries 
they expand to so that risk reduction strategies may 
be formulated and deployed. 
The results reveal the positive impact of 
institutional development on the sub-Saharan 
countries’ attractiveness to FDI. An analysis of the 
coefficients permit us to observe that control of 
corruption and government effectiveness are the 
institutional dimensions with greater impact. Results 
also permit us contrast with existing studies. For 
instance, Daude and Stein (2007) and Kaditi (2010) 
did not find a significant relationship between 
political stability and FDI, however they did not target 
African countries where the problems and risks 
related to political stability have a much higher 
Tab 3 
Variables and sources of data 
Variables 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE LN OF FDI INFLOWS  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Voice and accountability  0,684**        
Political stability   0,495*       
Control of corruption    0,978***      
Rule of law     0,874**     
Regulatory quality      0,770**    
Government effectiveness       0,820**   
Political stability and freedom        0,781**  
Government Efficiency         1,007*** 
Ln GDP 0,1004*** 0,0803 0,0742 0,0679 0,057 0,0633 0,0609 0,0683 0,0553 
GDP per capita 0,0002*** 0,0002*** 0,0002*** 0,0002*** 0,0001** 0,0002*** 0,0001** 0,0002*** 0,0001** 
Macroeconomic stability   0,0221 0,0073 0,0181 0,0203 0,0218 0,0148 0,0202 0,0105 0,0186 
Ln population 0,6116*** 0,6653*** 0,7654*** 0,733*** 0,6795*** 0,6003*** 0,6221*** 0,7634*** 0,6619*** 
Trade freedom -0,0172 -0,0287** -0,0284** -0,0286** -0,0294** -0,0282** -0,0265** -0,0326** -0,0301** 
Natural resources 0,0159 0,0286** 0,0218* 0,0348*** 0,0312** 0,0292** 0,0323** 0,0278** 0,0346*** 
Constant 9,977*** 8,966*** 7,8753*** 7,478*** 9,004*** 10,237*** 9,786*** 7,744*** 9,08*** 
Source: Data of Research 
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magnitude in comparison to transition and emerging 
countries. The frequent coup d’etat and military 
governments are just one of the visible signs. Cuervo-
Cazurra and Genc (2008) also failed to find significant 
effects but raised the possibility that we ought to 
examine the source countries of the FDI as there 
might be a positive relation between the host country 
being a former colony and the likelihood that MNCs 
from these former colonial powers will invest. Kaditi 
(2010) identified a statistically significant, but 
negative, relation of control of corruption with FDI, 
contrasting with a positive relation in our study, 
which may be due to the higher levels of pervasive 
and arbitrary corruption in, at least, some of the 
African countries. In fact, Kaditi’s (2010) negative 
coefficient may indicate what Cuervo-Cazurra (2006) 
referred to as corruption as “grease”. Thus, our study 
further contributes to understand that the analysis of 
well-established institutional indicators (such as 
those advanced by Kaufmann et al., 2009) need to be 
contextualized. And, when we examine extreme 
conditions, as seem to occur when analyzing sub-
Saharan Africa, the results may differ from previous 
studies in different institutional milieus. 
Albeit all hypotheses were confirmed, the analysis 
warrants additional comments. The indicator of 
‘voice and accountability’ captures the perception of 
freedom (Kaufmann et al., 2009) and may be 
especially important in sub-Saharan countries where 
both the citizens and the media are denied of basic 
rights and freedoms, and some countries have 
authoritarian regimes (Harms & Ursprung, 2002). 
Political instability  is particularly notorious in some of 
these countries, with military governments that came 
to power through coups, and where political changes 
are frequent (Peng & Health, 1996; Li & Resnick, 
2003). According to Anyanwu (2006), one of the 
biggest obstacles to conducting business in Africa is 
corruption. If corruption is endemic in both the public 
and private sectors, the mechanisms of control are 
not effective in preventing those behaviors and 
bribing may have become the legitimized way of 
doing business (Ades & Di Tella, 1997). In sum, it is 
important to understand the local idiosyncrasies 
pertaining to the institutional indicators to fully 
understand both their impact and what needs to be 
changed to improve thee countries ability to attract 
foreign investors (Darley, 2012). 
5.1 Beyond the region: A country analysis  
Albeit there are similarities among the 48 Sub-
Saharan countries, there are also notable differences. 
For instance, these countries are relatively poor, with 
primitive financial markets, lacking infrastructures, 
unqualified population and with governance 
deficiencies (Asiedu, 2004; Khalil & Dahou, 2009). The 
evidence is that 23 out of the 48 countries in the 
region have a GDP lower than 3 billion USD. However, 
there are also differences in relative wealth, human 
and natural resource endowments, political and 
social stability, and even economic development. 
The performance of the Sub-Saharan countries is 
poor in all institutional indicators. For instance, the 
indicator of control of corruption shows that 
corruption in endemic to these countries (Khalil & 
Dahou, 2009), with Angola, Equatorial Guinea, 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia holding 
the worst values. The deficiencies extend to 
government ineffectiveness, with South Africa, 
Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia and Seychelles the 
only countries with positive values. Moreover, some 
countries are very small and lack natural resources, 
such as Cape Verde, Mauritius and Seychelles. 
Nonetheless, observing that Angola, Congo, Nigeria 
and Sudan, jointly captured a total of 115,689 million 
USD in FDI and that these are countries with the 
lowest values in all institutional indicators, we have 
evidence that we ought to consider the impact of 
other factors beyond the institutional quality when 
assessing the sub-Saharan countries’ attractiveness 
to FDI. The natural resource endowment is an 
important determinant of FDI into Africa (Kinoshita & 
Campos, 2004; Asiedu, 2006). According to Adams 
(2009) the increased FDI inflows from 18 billion USD 
in 2004 to 36 billion in 2006, was due to the foreign 
interest in exploiting these countries’ natural 
resources. Thus, it is not surprising to find among the 
largest recipients of FDI in Africa countries with the 
largest natural and mineral resource pools (UNCTAD, 
2002) – the three largest FDI recipients in Africa, in 
the period 2000 to 2002, were Angola, Nigeria and 
South Africa, jointly absorbing 65% of the FDI inflows 
into the region (Asiedu, 2006) – especially given the 
increases in the prices of the mineral commodities 
(Ndikumana & Verick, 2008). Resource seeking FDI 
(see Dunning, 1993) is particularly influenced by such 
aspects as the availability, cost and quality of the 
natural resources, their development 
(transformation and commercialization) and the 
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infrastructure required for the exploitation and 
transport of those resources. 
5.2 Limitations and future research 
This study is not without limitations. Some are 
limitations pertain to the nature of the data on the 
countries examined, where we have serious scarcity 
of secondary reliable data that render unviable both 
studying other dimensions of the institutional 
environment, and delving into firm-level research. 
We have relied on the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators as veritable measures of institutional 
environments. However, albeit many studies have 
used these indicators, there have been criticisms 
pertaining to whether these indicators measure what 
they purport to measure, construct validity and 
estimated standard errors of estimation (see, Knack, 
2006; Iqbal & Shah, 2008; Thomas, 2010). 
Nonetheless, future research may, not without 
substantial cost, use a survey to firms in the region or 
employ other institutional indicators and perhaps 
better capture differences among this group of 
countries that have had different historical, economic 
and political trajectories. These studies may, for 
instance, better disentangle why Angola, Congo, 
Nigeria and Sudan that had a higher share of FDI and 
yet they among the lowest values in the institutional 
dimensions. Other aspects related to the natural 
resource endowments and cultural heritage of 
differential institutional quality may help understand 
better what is happening with FDI. 
Our study employed data at the sub-Saharan 
country level as FDI recipients. Similar aggregation of 
countries was made in other works (Gupta et al., 
2010; Darley, 2012). The institutional framework 
comprises both formal and informal components 
(Dumludag et al., 2009, Li & Ferreira, 2011). Formal 
rules are written rules, such as the laws concerning 
contracts, political systems, tariffs and quotas and the 
regulation of the financial system. Informal rules are 
unwritten and include such aspects as culture, 
behavioral norms and codes of conduct. For example, 
if the reality observed by the local firms differs from 
that perceived by foreign firms, then there may be 
evidence of the role of informal institutions (Peng & 
Heath, 1996; Peng, 2003). Future research may seek 
to better understand how the informal institutions 
differ among countries and how they impact FDI. 
Similarly, when the formal restrictions are absent or 
incomplete, the informal restrictions intervene to 
minimize uncertainty and provide a script managers 
may follow (Peng & Khoury, 2008). For instance, with 
the decline of the formal institutions in the transitions 
economies, informal ways of doing business gained 
strength in regulating economic activity during 
transition (North, 1990; Roth & Kostova, 2003). 
Hence, future studies may be relevant in understand 
how MNCs deal with the informal milieu of the host 
sub-Saharan countries. 
We observed high correlation among the 
institutional indicators, raising the well-known 
statistical concerns of multicollinearity, making it 
more difficult to examine each institutional 
dimension as mutually exclusive. Albeit it is 
reasonable that countries that are more (less) 
developed have a set of institutions more (less) 
sophisticated – and hence we might expect a positive 
correlation among the institutional variables (Mauro, 
1995) – the estimation of the coefficients may not be 
stable. For instance, corruption may induce a less 
efficient bureaucracy when governments establish 
additional obstacles with the aim of receiving bribes 
(Mauro, 1995). Nonetheless, there seems to be a 
positive relation between institutional quality and the 
sub-Saharan countries’ ability to attract FDI. 
Scholars may also delve into the source countries 
of the FDI. To at least some extent, it is possible that 
MNCs from other under-institutionalized countries 
develop the ability to effectively operate in sub-
Saharan Africa. These MNCs may have learned how 
to overcome the formal institutional voids and have 
developed manners to cope with it. In some sense, 
these MNCs may have developed political capabilities 
(Holtbrügge, 2007; Jiménez & Delgado, 2012) and are 
better prepared to deal under such institutional 
inefficiencies. In contrast, it is probable that MNCs 
from more developed countries simply avoid 
investing in such harsh environments and rather turn 
to other similarly developed nations (Cuervo-Cazurra 
& Genc, 2008), or, perhaps, nations that show 
progress in their institutional development. 
6. Conclusion 
In conducting FDI strategies MNCs need to consider 
the institutional differences to the host countries 
(Brouthers, 2002; Khoury & Peng, 2011) but also the 
specificities of the different facets of the institutional 
environments of the countries they are entering 
(Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008). Sub-Saharan 
countries are probably among the most extreme 
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cases of institutional voids, inefficiencies and 
ineffectiveness. Yet, some African governments have 
been putting in place reforms to improve the 
business environment for FDI, reducing investment 
barriers, privatizing state owned firms, increasing 
fiscal transparency, among others (Darley, 2012). 
Notwithstanding, institutional improvements have a 
long way to go to improve the investment climate of 
the countries in the region (Asiedu, 2006). 
Governments may act to improve institutional 
quality using political and legal instruments to 
improve the quality of the regulation and lower 
corruption, but there are many other factors to 
consider such as the natural resource endowment, 
the quality of the human capital, the trade and 
investment obstacles, macroeconomic stability and 
the size of the host market to increase further FDI 
inflows into the region. For MNCs the crux is to 
identify how institutional inefficiencies may impact 
their operations and how to overcome those 
obstacles. Nonetheless, the prospects show business 
opportunities in Africa that MNCs ought to pursue, 
raising the need to understand the challenges that 
need to be surpassed to effectively operate in these 
countries. 
7. References 
 ADAMS, S. (2009) Can foreign direct investment 
(FDI) help to promote growth in Africa? African 
Journal of Business Management, 3 (5), p. 178-
183. DOI: 10.5897/AJBM09.001 
 ADES, A.; DI TELLA, R. (1997) The causes and 
consequences of corruption: A review of recent 
empirical contributions. Institute of Development 
Studies Bulletin, 27 (2), p. 6-12. DOI: 
10.1111/j.1759-5436.1996.mp27002002.x 
 ANGHEL, B. (2005) Do institutions affect foreign 
direct investment? mimeo, Universidad 
Autónoma de Barcelona. 
 ANYANWU, J. (2006) Promoting of investment in 
Africa. African Development Review, 18 (1), p. 42-
71. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8268.2006.00132.x 
 ASIEDU, E. (2002) On the determinants of foreign 
direct investment to developing countries: Is 
Africa different?, World Development, 30, p. 107-
119. doi:10.1016/S0305-750X(01)00100-0 
 ASIEDU, E. (2004) Policy reform and foreign direct 
investment in Africa: Absolute progress but 
relative decline. Development Policy Review, 22, 
p. 41-48. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-
8659.2004.00237.x 
 ASIEDU, E. (2006) Foreign direct investment in 
Africa: The role of natural resources, market size, 
government policy, institutions and political 
instability. The World Economy, 29 (1), p. 63-77. 
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9701.2006.00758.x 
 ASIEDU, E.; LIEN, D. (2011) Democracy, foreign 
direct investment and natural resources. Journal 
of International Economics, 84, p. 99-111. 
Democracy, foreign direct investment and natural 
resources. Democracy, foreign direct investment 
and natural resources. 
doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2010.12.001 
 BENASSY-QUERE, A. ; COUPET, M.; MAYER, T. 
(2007) Institutional determinants of foreign direct 
investment. The World Economy, 30 (5), p. 764-
782. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9701.2007.01022.x 
 BERRY, H.; GUILLÉN, M.; ZHOU, N. (2010) An 
institutional approach to cross-national        
distance, Journal of International Business 
Studies, 41 (9), p. 1460-1480. 
doi:10.1057/jibs.2010.28 
 BHINDA, N.; GRIFFITH-JONES, S.; MARTIN, M. 
(1999) Foreign direct investment. In Bhinda, N. 
Leape, J., Martin, M. & Griffith-Jones, S. (Eds.), 
Private capital flows to Africa: Perception and 
reality. The Hague: Fondad Publication. DOI: 
10.1002/9780470670590.wbeog216 
 BLONIGEN, B. (2005) A review of the empirical 
literature on FDI determinants. Atlantic Economic 
Journal, v. 33, p. 383-403. DOI: 10.1007/s11293-
005-2868-9 
 BROUTHERS, K. (2002) Institutional, cultural and 
transaction cost influences on entry mode choice 
and performance. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 33 (2), p. 203-221. DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8491013 
 BUSSE, M.; HEFEKER, C. (2007) Political risk, 
institutions and foreign direct investment. 
European Journal of Political Economy, 23 (2), p. 
397-415. doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2006.02.003 
 BUSSE, M. (2004) Transnational corporations and 
repression of political rights and civil liberties: An 
empirical analysis. Kyklos, 57 (1), p. 45-66. DOI: 
10.1111/j.0023-5962.2004.00242.x 
 CLEEVE, E. (2008) How effective are fiscal 
incentives to attract FDI to sub-Saharan Africa? 
Journal of Developing Areas, 42, p. 135-153. 
 CUERVO-CAZURRA, A. (2006) Who cares about 
corruption? Journal of International Business 
The impact of selected institutional environment dimensions of  
sub-Saharan countries on their ability to attract foreign direct investment  
Internext | São Paulo, v.11, n. 1, p. 21-36, jan./abr. 2016 
33 
Studies, 37 (6) p. 807-822. 
doi:10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400223 
 CUERVO-CAZURRA, A. (2007) Better the devil you 
don’t know: Type of corruption and FDI in 
transition economies. Journal of International 
Management, 14 (1), p. 12-27. 
doi:10.1016/j.intman.2007.02.003 
 CUERVO-CAZURRA, A.; GENC, M. (2008) 
Transforming disadvantages into advantages: 
Developing-country MNEs in the least developed 
countries, Journal of International Business 
Studies, 39, p. 957-979. 
doi:10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400390 
 DARLEY, W. (2012) Increasing sub-Saharan 
Africa's share of foreign direct investment: Public 
policy challenges, strategies, and implications. 
Journal of African Business, 13 (1), p. 62-69. 
DOI:10.1080/15228916.2012.657981 
 DAUDE, C.; STEIN, E. (2007) The quality of 
institutions and foreign direct investment. 
Economics and Politics, 19, p. 317-344. DOI: 
10.1111/j.1468-0343.2007.00318.x 
 DELIOS, A.; HENISZ, W. (2000) Japanese firms' 
investment strategies in emerging economies. 
Academy of Management Journal, 43 (3), p. 305-
23. doi: 10.2307/1556397 
 DIMAGGIO, P.; POWELL, W. The iron cage 
revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective 
rationality in organizational fields. American 
Sociological Review, v. 48, p.147-160, 1983. 
 DIXON, D.; POLYAKOV, E. (1998) Business as an 
anathema government: The path to private 
business. USSR Business and Economic History, 27 
(1), p. 173-185. 
 DUMLUDAG, D.; SARIDOGAN E.; KURT, S. (2009) 
Determinants of foreign direct investment: An 
institutionalist approach. Seventh Conference of 
the European Historical Economics Society, Lund 
University. 
 DUNNING, J. (1988) The Ecletic paradigm of 
international production: A restatement and 
some possible extensions, Journal of International 
Business Studies, 19 (1), p. 1-31. 
 DUNNING, J. (1993) Multinational enterprises and 
the global economy. Wokingham: Addison-
Wesley. 
 DUPASQUIER, C.; OSAKWE, P. (2006) Foreign 
direct investment in Africa: Performance, 
challenges, and responsibilities. Journal of Asian 
Economics, 17 (2), p. 241-260. 
doi:10.1016/j.asieco.2005.07.002 
 ESTRIN, S.; HUGHES, K.; TODD, S. (1997) Foreign 
Direct Investment in Central and Eastern Europe. 
London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
DOI: 10.1007/BF02928116 
 FABRY, N.; ZEGHINI, S. (2006) FDI in the new 
European neighbors of Southern Europe: A quest 
of institutions-based attractiveness. University 
Library of Munich, MPRA Paper No 1109.  
 GLOBERMAN, S., SHAPIRO, D.; TANG, Y. (2004) 
Foreign direct investment in emerging and 
transition European countries. Western 
Washington University. 
 GROSSE, R.; TREVINO, L. (2005) New institutional 
economics and FDI location in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Management International Review, 45 
(2), p. 123-145. 
 GUPTA, V.; LEVENBURG, N.; MOORE, L.; 
MOTWANI, J.; SCHWARZ, T. (2010) Family 
business in sub-Saharan Africa versus the Middle 
East. Journal of African Business, 11 (1), p. 146-
162. DOI:10.1080/15228916.2010.508992 
 HARMS, P.; URSPRUNG, H. (2002) Do civil and 
political repressions really boost foreign direct 
investment? Economic Inquiry, 40, p. 651-663. 
 HENISZ, W.; SWAMINATHAN, A. (2008) 
Institutions and international business. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 39, p. 537-539. 
 HENISZ, W. (2000) The institutional environment 
for multinational investment. Journal of Law, 
Economics and Organization, 6 (2), p. 334-364. 
doi: 10.1093/jleo/16.2.334 
 HOLMES, R.; MILLER, T.; HITT, M.; SALMADOR, M. 
(2012) The interrelationships among informal 
institutions, formal institutions, and inward 
foreign direct investment. Journal of 
Management, 39 (2), p. 531-566. doi: 
10.1177/0149206310393503 
 HOLTBRÜGGE, D.; BERG, N.; PUCK, J. (2007) To 
bribe or to convince? Political stakeholders and 
political activities in German multinational 
corporations. International Business Review, 16, 
p. 47-67. doi:10.1016/j.ibusrev.2006.11.001 
 IQBAL, K.; SHAH, A. (2008) How do the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators measure up? available in: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PSGLP/Reso
urces/Howdoworldwidegovernanceindicatorsme
asureup.pdf. Access:28/01/2016  
 JENSEN, N. (2003) Democratic governance and 
multinational corporations: The political economy 
of foreign direct investment. International 
M. P. Ferreira & J. G. Ferreira 
Internext | São Paulo, v.11, n. 1, p. 21-36, jan./abr. 2016 
34 
Organization, 57 (3), p. 587-616. DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818303573040 
 JIMÉNEZ, A.; DELGADO, J. (2012) Proactive 
management of political risk and corporate 
performance: The case of Spanish multinational 
enterprises. International Business Review, 21 (6), 
p. 1029-1040. doi:10.1016/j.ibusrev.2011.11.008 
 KADITI, E. (2010) Foreign investments and 
institutional convergence in South Eastern 
Europe, Centre for European policy studies 
(CEPS), Catholic University of Leuven, LICOS 
Discussion Paper No. 260/2010. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1619817 
 KAUFMANN, D.; KRAAY, A.; ZOIDO-LOBATON, P. 
(1999) Aggregating governance indicators, World 
Bank Policy Research Department Working Paper 
No. 2195. 
 KAUFMANN, D.; KRAAY, A.; MASTRUZZI, M. 
(2003) Governance matters III: Governance 
indicators 1996‐2002. Working paper 3106, 
World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
 KAUFMANN, D.; KRAAY, A.; MASTRUZZI, M. 
(2009) Governance matters VIII: Aggregate and 
individual governance indicators for 1996‐2008. 
Working Paper 4978. World Bank, Washington, 
D.C. 
 KHALIL, K.; DAHOU, K. (2009) Investment: 
Unlocking Africa’s potential. OECD journal 
General Papers, 9 (1), p. 37-62. 
 KHOURY, T.; PENG, M. (2011) Does institutional 
reform of intellectual property rights lead to more 
inbound FDI? Evidence from Latin America and 
the Caribbean. Journal of World Business, 46, p. 
336-345. doi:10.1016/j.jwb.2010.07.015 
 KINOSHITA, Y.; CAMPOS, N. (2004) Estimating the 
determinants of foreign direct investment inflows: 
How important are sampling and omitted variable 
biases?, BOFIT – Institute for Economies in 
Transition, Bank of Finland, Discussion Papers, Nº 
10.  
 KNACK, S.; KEEFER, P. (1995) Institutions and 
economic performance: Cross-country tests using 
alternative institutional measures. Economic and 
Politics, 7, p. 207-227. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-
0343.1995.tb00111.x 
 KNACK, S. (2006) Measuring corruption in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia: A critique of the cross-
country indicators. Washington DC: World Bank. 
 LEVINE, R.; RENELT, D. A (1992) sensitivity analysis 
of cross-country growth regressions. American 
Economic Review, 82, p. 942-963. 
 LI, D.; FERREIRA, M. (2011) Institutional 
environment and firms' sources of financial 
capital in Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of 
Business Research, 64, p. 371-376. 
doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2010.08.013 
 LI, Q.; RESNICK, A. (2003) Reversal of fortunes: 
Democratic institutions and foreign direct 
investment inflows to developing countries. 
International Organization, 57, p. 175-211. 
doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2010.08.013 
 MATEEV, M. (2009) Determinants of foreign 
direct investment in Central and Southeastern 
Europe: New empirical tests. Oxford Journal, 8 (1), 
p. 133-149. 
 MAURO, P. (1995). Corruption and growth. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, p. 681-712. 
 MMIEH, F.; OWUSU-FRIMPONG, N. (2004) State 
policies and the challenges in attracting foreign 
direct investment: A review of the Ghana 
experience. Thunderbird International Business 
Review, 46 (5), p. 575-599. DOI: 
10.1002/tie.20025 
 MORISSET, J. (2000) Foreign direct investment to 
Africa: Policies also matter. Transnational 
Corporation, 9, p. 107-125. 
 NAUDE, W.; KRUGELL, W. (2007) Investigating 
geography and institutions as determinants of 
foreign direct investment in Africa using panel 
data. Applied Economics, 39, p. 1223-1233. 
DOI:10.1080/00036840600567686 
 NDIKUMANA, L.; VERICK, S. (2008) The linkages 
between FDI and domestic investment: 
Unravelling the developmental impact of foreign 
investment in sub-Saharan Africa, Development 
Policy Review, 26 (6), p. 713-726. DOI: 
10.1111/j.1467-7679.2008.00430.x 
 NDIKUMANA, L. (2003) Capital flows, capital 
account regimes and foreign exchange rate 
regimes in Africa, in UNCTAD Management of 
capital flows: Comparative Experiences and 
Implications for Africa. Geneva: UNCTAD. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.378900 
 NORTH, D. (1990) Institutions, institutional 
change, and economic performance. Cambridge, 
England: Cambridge University Press. 
 OLSON, M. (1995) Why the transition from 
communism is so difficult. Eastern Economic 
Journal, 21 (4), p. 437–61. 
 PENG, M.; HEATH, P. (1996) The growth of the 
firm in planned economies in transition: 
institutions, organizations, and strategic choice. 
The impact of selected institutional environment dimensions of  
sub-Saharan countries on their ability to attract foreign direct investment  
Internext | São Paulo, v.11, n. 1, p. 21-36, jan./abr. 2016 
35 
Academy of Management Review, 21 (2) p. 492-
528. doi: 10.5465/AMR.1996.9605060220 
 PENG, M.; KHOURY, T. (2008) Unbundling the 
institution-based view of international business 
strategy, in Rugman, A. (Ed.) The Oxford 
Handbook of International Business, p. 256-268. 
New York, NY: Oxford University Press. DOI: 
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199234257.003.0010 
 PENG, M. (2003) Institutional transitions and 
strategic choices. Academy of Management 
Review, 28 (2) p. 275–96. doi: 
10.5465/AMR.2003.9416341 
 RESMINI, L. (2000) The determinants of foreign 
direct investment in the CEECs: New evidence 
from sectorial patterns. Economics of Transition, 
8 (3), p. 665-689. DOI: 10.1111/1468-0351.00060 
 ROGOFF, K.; REINHART, C. (2003) FDI to Africa: 
The role of price stability and currency instability. 
International Monetary Fund, Working Paper 
03/10. 
 ROOT, F. (1994) Entry strategies for international 
markets. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. 
 ROSE-ACKERMAN, S. (1999) Corruption and 
government: Causes, consequences and reform, 
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
 ROTH, K.; KOSTOVA, T. (2003) Organizational 
coping with institutional upheaval in transition 
economies. Journal of World Business, 38, p. 314-
330. doi:10.1016/j.jwb.2003.08.018 
 SCOTT, W. (1995) Institutions and organizations, 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 SHLEIFER, A.; VISHNY, R. (1993). Corruption. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108 (3), p. 599-
617.  
 SINGH, H.; JUN, K. (1995) Some new evidence on 
determinants of foreign direct investment in 
developing countries, The World Bank, working 
paper, Washington DC: The World Bank. 
 THOMAS, M. (2010) What do the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators measure? European 
Journal of Development Research, 22, p. 31-54. 
doi:10.1057/ejdr.2009.32 
 UHLENBRUCK, K.; RODRIGUEZ, P.; DOH, J.; EDEN, 
L. (2006) The impact of corruption on entry 
strategy: Evidence from telecommunication 
projects in emerging economies, Organization 
Science, 17 (3), p. 402-414. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1060.0186 
 UNCTAD. (2002) World Investment Report: 
Transnational Corporations and Export 
Competitiveness (New York and Geneva: United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development). 
 UNCTAD. (2008) World Investment Report, TNCs 
and the Infrastructural Challenge. Embargo (New 
York and Geneva: United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development). 
 WEI, S. (2000) How taxing is corruption on 
internal investors? Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 82 (1), p. 1-11. 
doi:10.1162/003465300558533 
 WORLD BANK. (2005) World bank atlas (36th ed). 
Washington, D.C.: World Bank Publications. 
 
 
About the Authors 
 Manuel Portugal Ferreira has doctorate in Business Administration from the University of Utah, UTAH, 
United States. Professor at the University Nove de Julho in the Master’s and Doctorate Program of 
Administration – Uninove, São Paulo, SP, Brazil. E-mail: manuel.portugal.ferreira@gmail.com 
 Justino Gomes Ferreira has Undergraduate (Licentiate) in Public Administration and Master in 
International Business. Polytechnic Institute of Leiria and researcher at the globADVANTAGE – Center 
of Research in International Business & Strategy. His research interests lie in the area of the institutional 
environment, especially in the context of foreign investment in Africa. E-mail: 
justinoferreira.1989@hotmail.com 
 
 
 
 
M. P. Ferreira & J. G. Ferreira 
Internext | São Paulo, v.11, n. 1, p. 21-36, jan./abr. 2016 
36 
O impacto de dimensões selecionadas do ambiente 
institucional dos países da África Subsaariana na sua 
capacidade de atrair investimento estrangeiro 
Manuel Portugal FerreiraAB e Justino Gomes FerreiraB 
AUniversidade Nove de Julho – Uninove, São Paulo, SP, Brasil 
BInstituto Politécnico de Leiria (IPL), Leiria, Portugal 
DETALHES DO ARTIGO 
 
RESUMO 
Histórico do artigo: 
Recebido em 23 de julho de 2015 
Aceito em 24 de março de 2016 
Disponível online em 30 de abril de 2016 
 
Sistema de Revisão “Double Blind Review” 
Editor científico: 
Eduardo Eugênio Spers 
A pesquisa em negócios internacionais aponta para o ambiente institucional como 
um determinante crucial da capacidade de os países atraírem investimento 
estrangeiro direto (IED). No entanto, a pesquisa existente tem estado mais focada 
em compreender o ambiente institucional específico de economias emergentes e 
em transição deixando descurados os países africanos. Neste artigo analisamos o 
impacto de seis dimensões institucionais selecionadas na capacidade de os países 
da África Subsaariana atraírem influxos de IED. Os resultados mostram que a 
qualidade do ambiente institucional está positivamente relacionada com o IED 
nestes países, confirmando estudos anteriores em outras localizações, mas 
mostrando algumas diferenças notáveis. Estendemos a pesquisa existente sobre 
os ambientes e distâncias institucionais para contextos de extrema sub-
institucionalização que caracterizam muita da região da África Subsaariana. 
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